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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BOUNTIFUL STATE BANK, a Utah cor-
poration, FARMERS ST ATE BANK a 
Utah corporation, SOUTH DAVIS SEC-
URITY BANK, a Utah corporation, and 
DA VIS COUNTY BANK, a Utah corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
W. S. BRIMHALL, COMMISSIONER OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, and WALKER BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, a Utah corpora-
tion, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11807 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County by plaintiffs Bountiful State Bank, 
Farmers State Bank, South DaYis Security Bank and 
Davis County Bank (herein sometimes referred to as 
the "Competing Banks") against \V. S. Brimhall, Com-
missioner of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah 
(the "Commissioner") and "\V alker Bank & Trust Com-
pany ("\Valk er Bank") for review of a decision of the 
t'ommissioner granting the application of Walker Bank 
for permission to establish a branch bank in Centerville, 
1 
Davis County, Utah. The action \ms brought pursuant 
to Section 7-1-26, Utah Cocle Annotated l 9:J3, as amend-
ed. The Competing Banks were protestauts to the ap-
pliration of \Valker Bank in the proceedings before the 
Commissioner. 
DISPOSITION I)J LO\VER COURT 
The District Court granted the motion of \Yalker 
Bank for a Summary Judgment which determined that 
the Commissioner's Order granting the application of 
\Valker Bank for the branch bank was supported by the 
0\·idence at the hearing before the Commissioner, that 
the Order was not arbitrary or capricious nor did the 
Commissioner abuse his discretion, that the Order of the 
Commissioner granting the application to Walker Bank 
''should be and is here by sustained'' and that the com-
plaint of the Competing Banks should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
seek affirmance of the judgment of the 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents accept the statement of facts of Ap-
pellants with the following clarifications and additions: 
The Commissioner specifically found that all of the 
Competing Banks are "financially stable and secure 
i11stitutions aud surh stability would not be jeopardized 
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or 1 Ji(• i11t0r0sts of the puhlil' impaired the establish-
ment and operation of the proposed branch." Among 
<>ther [hi11gs, the Commissioner conclude>cl that "increas-
ed competition from the proposed branch bank would not 
umeasonahly intPrfere with the operation of the exist-
ing banks and branches [in the area] .... would not 
jeopanlize the derJOsitors of such hanks, would not in-
terfrre \\ ith tl1e ability of these banks to maintain their 
fiwmcial strength and would Hot impair their ability to 
compete with the applicant bank and other banks." 
The Commissioner further conclude(} in Conclusion 
No. + (R. 33) that "the public convenience and advan-
tage would be subscn·ed and promoted by the establish-
ment of the proposed branch at the location pro-
1;1Jsed .... " 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE D E C I S I 0 N OF THE 
SIONER DID NOT IGNORE THE IMP ACT 
OF THE PROPOSED BRANCH UPON THE 
OPERATIONS OF BOUNTIFUL ST ATE 
BANK. 
In Appellants' POINT I, they take the nry limited 
,·ie\v that the Commissioner "ignored" the impact of 
-walker Bank branch on the operations of the Center-
,·ille> lmrneh of Bountiful State Bank. In doing so, Ap-
1iella11ts ''ignore'' the Findings and Conclusions of the 
( 'ommissioner (R. 31-33) which clearly demonstrate 
tl1at the Commissioner directly considered the effect of 
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the Walker Bank branch on the operations of the other 
banks in the area. He specifically concluded that the 
Walker Bank branch ''would not unreasonably interfere 
with the operation of the existing hanks and branches" 
located in south Davis County. This conclusion covers 
the effect of the Walker Bank branch on the operations 
of all of the Competing Banks, including Bountiful State 
Bank and including the Centerville branch of Bountiful 
State Bank. The Findings also clearly indicate that the 
effect on the Competing Banks was considered. For ex-
ample, in Finding No. 11, the Commissioner determined 
that the Competing Banks have operated from their re-
spective places of business "a sufficient period of time 
to have an established business at such locations," that 
all such banks "are financially stable and secure and 
such stability \vould not be jeopardized or the interests 
of the public impaired by the establishment and opera-
tion'' of the Walker Bank branch. The Commissioner 
also found that the Competing Banks have been able to 
compete successfully in the past with other financial 
institutions and, coupled with his conclusion that competi-
tion from the Walker Bank branch would not unreason-
ably interfere with the operation of any of the Compet-
ing Banks, it is clear that the Commissioner very serious-
ly considered the ''impact'' of the Walker Bank branch 
upon the operations of all of the Competing Banks, in-
cluding Bountiful State Bank. 
It is true that at the hearing Mr. Jeppsen, the 
President of Bountiful State Bank, opined that com-
petition from the Walker Bank branch would be "dis-
astrous'' to the Centerville branch of Bountiful State 
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Bank ( R. 383). Of course, this was offered only as an 
opinion and an opinion that may not have been shared 
by the Commissioner. There was substantial evidence 
which would support a contrary opinion. We are sure 
that the Competing Banks would not contend that the 
Commissioner is compelled to believe all of the evidence 
much less all of the opinions that are given. 
It is, of course, the Commissioner's job as an expert 
in the banking field to weigh facts and opinions and 
arrive at his own conclusions. But even Mr. Jeppsen was 
only discussing the effect on the Centerville branch of 
his bank. On cross-examination he testified that the 
safety of the depositors of the bank as a whole (which 
necessarily includes the depositors at the Centerville 
branch) would not be jeopardized (R. 389). He did not 
testify that the effect on the stockholders of the bank 
would be ''disastrous'', but only that the profits of the 
lHmk might be reduced. He did not even testify that the 
Bountiful State Bank would become unprofitable because 
of the Walker Bank branch, but only that profits would 
he diminished (R. 389). This, of course, is what may be 
the result of any competition. From a bank whose re-
sources have grown from approximately $4,000,000 in 
1934 to $11,600,000 in 1967 (Exhibit 1, Table IV-8, p. 57) 
whose loans and discounts increased 15% between 1960 
and 1967 (Exhibit 1, Table IV-11, p. 63; R. 26-27, Ad-
mission 11) and which has successfully competed with 
a new unit bank in the area (R. 390, 393-394), a little 
additional competition from Walker Bank would be a 
healthy situation, at least from the point of view of the 
public. 
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ot all the Competing Banks foresaw the same 
"disaster'' as Bountiful State Bank. Note the testimony 
of the President of Farmers State Bank (R. 298-331), 
particularly his comments concerning the growth of his 
bank in face of new competition in the past (R. 319-321), 
his predictions of growth in the local economy (R. 322-
324) and his opinion that his bank would safely survive 
the "\Valker Bank competition (R. 327-329). See also the 
testimony of the President of South Davis Security Bank 
(R. 346-379) outlining the efforts of his bank in breaking 
into the south Davis area, competing successfully with 
the existing banks (R. 361-364, 368), that he presently 
is competing for business with Walker Bank and the 
competition wouldn't change "a lot" if Walker's opened 
a branch in Centerville (R. 372). 
In substance, the Competing Banks' complaint is 
that there ·would be more competition if the Walker 
Bank branch was established. This we can concede and, 
of course, competition is quite appropriate in banking as 
well as in most other business activity. However, the 
branch banking statutes are not designed to protect 
banks from competition or to turn banks into public 
utilitit'S guaranteed a profit. Banking is a regulated in-
dustry, but it is regulated for the public interest, not for 
the interest of existing banks. The statutory criteria is 
the public convenience and advantage, not the conven-
ience and ad\·antage of existing banks. For a discussion 
of this important distinction see In re Application of 
Howard Savings Institution of Newark, 32 N.J. 209, 159 
6 
A.2d 113 at 123 ;Da,uplt in Deposit Trust Co. i:. Myers, 401 
Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86 at 92 (1960); Delau,·are County 
N atiunal Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. 311, 106 A.2d 416 
at 422; Blairsville National Ba<nk v. IIIyers (Pa. 1963), 
181 A.2d 655; Philadelphia Sai:ing Fund Society v . 
• 11yers, 406 Pa. 328, 179 A.2d 209. 
While it is certainly proper for the Commissioner to 
consider the effect of new competition on existing banks 
and while it is beyond question that the Commissioner 
did so in this case, the Commissioner is not required 
by any statutory provision to consider this effect in the 
sense used by Appellants. Appellants cite 7-1-26(1), re-
ferring to "unreasonable interference" with an es-
tablished financial institution. This provision does not 
apply to branch bank applications but only to applica-
tions for new bank charters and charters for other 
financial organizations supervised by the Commissioner, 
such as savings and loans, credit unions and small loan 
licensees (see 7 -3-12; 7 -13-3 ; 7-9-3 ; former § 7-10-3; also 
the reference in 7-1-26(1) to the character of "the in-
corporators or organizers" can only apply to new or-
ganizations not to existing banks applying for branches). 
Where branch bank applications were intended to be 
covered, as in subsection (4) of 7-1-26 relating to court 
reyiew, the Legislature was specific in the reference to 
branch banks. 
The criteria for establishment of branch banks is 
set forth in § 7-3-6, UCA 1953. There are three criteria 
applicable to all branch banks and that are applicable 
in this case: (1) adequate capitalization; (2) location 
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of the branch in a permissible area (within the corporate 
limits of a city or town where no unit bank is located 
' within Salt Lake City, or ·within unincorporated areas 
of Salt Lake County) ; and ( 3) proof to the satisfaction 
of the Commissioner that the public convenience and 
advantage ·will be subserved and promoted by the es-
tablishment of the branch bank. See Walker Bank d'; 
Trust Cnmpa11y v. Brimhall, U.2d , 461 P.2d 
730 (No\'. 20, 1969). The next to the last paragraph of 
§ 7-3-6 establishes a fourth criteria for some branches 
located in Salt Lake County, viz., that if the branch is 
located in unincorporated areas, it shall not be establish-
ed ''in such close proximity to an established bank or 
branch as to unreasonably interfere with the business 
thereof.'' But where the branch is located within the cor-
porate limits of a city or town as is the case here and 
as must be the case for all branches outside of Salt Lake 
County, only the three criteria are applicable. 
Thus. it cannot be said in any sense that as a matter 
of law the Commissioner must deny a branch application 
because the operation of that branch in competing for 
husiuess with an existing bank might reduce the profits 
of the existing bank. This is the natural result of any 
competition and certainly was within the contemplation 
of the Legislature \\'hen it established the criteria for 
branch bank applications. Excessive competition, as in 
areat' with too many banks, for example, can have an 
effect on the public by affecting the financial stability 
of an existing bank so seriously that members of the 
puhliC' might be damaged. This might result in a decline 
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in the ability of the bank to perform proper sen·ices or, 
iu an extreme case, in the insolvency of the bank. These 
are proper concerns for the Legislature, for the Commis-
sioner and for the public at large. These are the ques-
tions the Commissioner addressed himself to as evidenc-
ed by the Findings and Conclusions previously cited. To 
insulate existing banks from new competition or to apply 
a standard which prohibited new branches if existing 
banks might lose profits would clearly be improper and 
not authorized or required by our laws. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSIONER MADE ALL RE-
QUIRED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
R E G A R D I N G T H E W AL K E R BANK 
BRANCH AND THERE IS NO JUSTIFICA-
TION FOR SETTING ASIDE HIS DECI-
SION. 
The Competing Banks apparently seek in POINT II 
of their Brief to have this Court set aside its recent de-
cision in the case of Walker Bank & Trust Company v. 
Brimhall, supra, which involved a proposed branch in 
South Ogden which would serve Ogden, other parts 
of -vv eber County and north Davis County. The basic 
argument of the Competing Banks appears to be that 
because Walker Bank indicated in this case that it would 
seek business for its Centerville branch from Center-
ville, Bountiful and other cities, towns and unincorporat-
ed areas in south Davis County, coupled with the fact 
that the proposed branch location is in a shopping center 
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near the boundary line behveen Centerville and Bounti-
ful, in some way the criteria for establishing a branch 
bank have not been met. They repeat the argument 
whieh this court rejected in the Brimhall case that ex-
isting banks are insulated from competition except from 
new unit banks or, to put it another way, that branch 
banks cannot be established in locations which will com-
pete for hm::iness with existing banks. 
The holding of this Court in lValker Bank cf; Trust 
Cmnpauy r. Brimhall, supra, was that the branch bank-
ing laws clo not limit the service area of a branch. If the 
hrauch is to br established in a lawful location, it can 
do business with anyone and can compete for business 
with any existiug bank. This Court did say that geo-
graphy could he a fador in the question of public con-
venience all(1 advantage and it is obvious from the Find-
ings aml Conclusions that were made that geography 
in this sousP was taken into account by the Commissioner. 
\Vl1ik t}w Competing Banks assert that the Commis-
sioner failed to make Findings on the geographical lo-
eaitou of tl1e proposed branch, this is a clear misreading 
of t be Fincli11g-s and Conclusions that were made. Find-
ing of Fact No. 8 indicates the nature of the City of 
Cenknille as it relates to the statutory criteria for lo-
rn ting hnrneli hanks. The precise location of the branch 
i:-: refcnell to in Fiucliug No. 10 and this location in 
refrrence to the location of existing banks is referred 
to in Fimling No. 11. The service area of the proposed 
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branch is referred to in Finding No. 16. It would serve 
no useful purpose to the Competing Banks or to anyone 
rlse to have a specific Finding to the effect that Center-
\'ille and Bountiful adjoin one another, that each are 
residential communities as distinguished from industrial 
an•as or, least of all, that the principal stockholder of 
\Valker Bank is \Vestern Bancorporation. The Com-
missioner did find that \Valker Bank is the largest state 
bank in Utah (Finding No. 7) and that existing banks 
se1Te in the same area proposed to be served from the 
\Valker Bank branch (Finding No. 11). Surely, details 
of the economics of the area, assessed valuation statis-
tics, traffic patterns, physical features of the area, size 
and location of existing banks, and similar details need 
not be specified, although such matters were in evidence 
and before the Commissioner for his consideration, in-
cluding all of the matters which the Competing Banks 
now contend at pages 15 and 19 of their Brief, are re-
quired Findings. \Ve wonder what further Findings the 
Competing Banks would have the Commissioner make T 
If the Commissioner is obligated to be more specific 
than he has been in this case, it appears that you enter 
into the area of probing the mental proeesses of the 
Commissioner which was specifically condemned by this 
court in Zions First National Bank v. Taylor, 15 U.2d 
239, 390 P.2d 854 (Syllabus 3 and 4). 
One must also consider that all of these arguments 
now made were fully and forcefully made by the Com-
peting Banks to the Commissioner ( R. 489-513) and such 
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arguments were rejected because the application was 
granted. It is also significant that the Commissioner de-
cided to permit the branch in this case even though at 
the time the Attorney General had ruled that the ap-
plication for the South Ogden branch must be rejected 
and this Court had not ruled to the contrary (the Com-
missioner acted in this case on February 28, 1969, prior 
to the N o\·ember 20 decision of this court). Thus, there 
is not the slightest doubt but that the Commissioner 
would ban' arriYcd at the same conclusion, even though 
he did not make a negative Finding that the geographic 
location did not militate against the public convenience 
and adYantage. Apparently this vms not true in Salt 
Lake City r. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 581, 137 
P.2d 364. Hence, such case is not applicable here. 
The proper standard to be applied as established 
by the branch banking statutes and by the decision of 
this court in the Brimhall case is the public convenience 
and advantage. Findings and Conclusions were made by 
the Commissioner in this case that the public convenience 
and advantage would be subserved and promoted by the 
establishment of the Walker Bank branch in Centerville 
at the location proposed by the applicant. Tested by this 
stam1anl, tlH• only question remaining for this Court, 
is whether such determination was arbitrary and capri-
eious. It is not the function of this Court to substitute 
its judgment for the judgment of the Commissioner or 
to require Findings and Conclusions to be redrafted to 
11eg-::i.tivc all arguments of the unsuccessful parties to the 
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administrative hearing. See Walker Bank <f Trust Com-
pany 1·. Brimhall, supra; .11 ountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Company v. Public Service Commission, 107 
Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184; Salt Lake Transfer v. Public 
Service Commission, 11 U.2d 121, 355 P.2d 706; Withers 
I'. Golding, 100 Utah 179, 111 P.2d 550; Erkman v. Civil 
Service Commission, 114 Utah 228, 198 P.2d 238; Build-
ing Service Employees, Etc. v. Newhouse Realty Co., 
97 Utah 562, 95 P.2d 507; Hotel Uta.Ji v. Industrial Com-
mission, 116 Utah 443, 211 P.2d 200. 
Where, as in this case, the Competing Banks re-
ceived a fair hearing (and this is conceded by the Ap-
pellants on page 10 of their Brief) and where the Com-
missioner has made Findings and Conclusions on the 
required three statutory criteria set forth in Walker 
Bank & Trust Company v. Brimhall, supra, the review-
ing court should affirm the decision unless it is plain 
that the Commissioner has acted arbitrarily. There can 
be no question that in the three very full days of hear-
ings before the Commissioner, the Competing Banks 
were able to present what evidence they had and argu-
ments they might make to defeat the application of 
Bank. No item of evidence offered by the Com-
peting Banks was refused. Time for argument was af-
forded. All of the evidence presented was thoroughly 
considered by the Commissioner as evidenced by his de-
tailed Findings and Conclusions. In the absence of a 
clear showing of arbitrariness, the court should not in-
13 
terf ere but should affirm the decision of the Commis-
sioner as \\'as done by the court below. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. R. WALDO, JR. 
Of JONES, WALDO, HOL-
BROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Walker Bank & Trust Company 
VERNON ROMNEY, Attorney 
General 
H. WRIGHT VOLKER, Assist-
ant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
W. S. Brimhall 
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